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AN INVISIBLE CRISIS IN PLAIN SIGHT:
THE EMERGENCE OF THE “EVICTION ECONOMY,”
ITS CAUSES, AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM
IN LEGAL REGULATION AND EDUCATION
David A. Dana*
Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City. By Mat-
thew Desmond. New York: Crown Publishers. 2016. Pp. xi, 341. $28.
Introduction
In Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City, Matthew Desmond1
explores the lives of landlords who evict and tenants who are evicted in poor
neighborhoods of Milwaukee. While the book could be understood as sim-
ply an ethnography of a handful of landlords and their low-income tenants
in one mid-sized American city, it is much more. Evicted, read in conjunc-
tion with Desmond’s prior scholarship, illustrates the emergence of what I
call an “Eviction Economy” in our cities—an economy in which eviction of
the poor is not exceptional, but rather the norm, part of landlords’ business
models and poor people’s way of life. The greatest achievement of Evicted is
that it makes this Eviction Economy, and the terrible human and societal
toll it takes, visible to a broad audience. However, as much as it provides a
compelling descriptive account of the Eviction Economy, Evicted is not fully
persuasive in its explanation of the rise of the Eviction Economy. In particu-
lar, Desmond’s argument that the Eviction Economy is caused by landlords’
charging exploitative rents is conceptually and empirically problematic. As a
response to the Eviction Economy, Desmond primarily calls for a robust
universal voucher program, which would indeed address the lack of supply
of affordable housing. But the political feasibility of such a program is ques-
tionable. Evicted does not address less sweeping reforms that could be both
politically feasible and effective in limiting the scope and harmful effects of
the Eviction Economy.
Part I of this Review summarizes Evicted and discusses what makes it
such a remarkable achievement. Part II addresses the question of why the
Eviction Economy has arisen and the problems in Desmond’s causal expla-
nation. Part III addresses Desmond’s universal voucher reform proposal and
outlines three reforms that Desmond does not explicitly advocate but that
might be both politically feasible and effective in empowering low-income
tenants.
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Social Sciences, Harvard University.
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I. Making the Eviction Economy Visible
Foreclosure—and not eviction—has been the housing crisis that has
dominated public discourse in recent years. When the housing market and
the accompanying securitization market collapsed beginning in 2007, every-
one took note. The waves of foreclosures that resulted from the dramatic
drop in home values drew the attention of national and local media, courts
and lawyers, legal scholars and (to an extent) legislatures.2 At a minimum,
the foreclosure crisis was visible to everyone.
And yet, as Evicted teaches us, there is another phenomenon in the
housing market worthy of the label “crisis” that (to date) has attracted al-
most no attention from media, courts, lawyers, legal scholars, or legislatures.
Unlike the foreclosure crisis, the crisis Desmond describes, using both sur-
vey research and an ethnographic account, involves low-income, urban indi-
viduals who lose possession of their rental premises, rather than losing
possession of homes they owned in fee simple.3 These low-income tenants
are disproportionately African American women with children (p. 98). And
unlike the foreclosure crisis, the crisis Desmond describes does not seem to
be a transitory or transitional phenomenon but rather a new, permanent
part of the urban economy. While there was always reason to think the fore-
closure crisis would abate as prices stabilized and lenders adopted stricter
underwriting, nothing in Evicted suggests that the eviction crisis will neces-
sarily diminish in due course.
The part of the housing economy Desmond describes, which I call the
Eviction Economy (Desmond does not use that label), is a private market
economy: the tenants in the Eviction Economy do not live in public housing
and have not been able to access housing subsidies in the form of Section 8
vouchers, for which there are very long waiting lists in most areas (pp.
59–60, 223–24). As Desmond explains, most people who qualify for public
housing or housing vouchers due to poverty do not in fact receive public
housing or housing vouchers (pp. 59, 302–03). Quite the contrary, “[t]hree
in four families who qualified for [housing] assistance receive[ ] nothing”
(p. 59). These tenants face a private rental market in which even low-quality
housing rents can consume as much as 80 to 90 percent of their monthly
income,4 and that is in months in which they do not face some unusual
interruption in their flow of income. These tenants are one relative’s funeral
expense or lost shift at work away from falling behind on their rent; in fact,
they are often unable to make their rent, and thus are regularly subject to the
2. See, e.g., Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public
Purpose Approach, 45 Hous. L. Rev. 683 (2008); David A. Dana, Why Mortgage “Formalities”
Matter, 24 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 505 (2012); Craig E. Pollack & Julia F. Lynch, Opinion,
Foreclosures Are Killing Us, N.Y. Times (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/03/
opinion/foreclosures-are-killing-us.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review); Editorial,
Will Foreclosure Abuses Ever End?, N.Y. Times (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
10/23/opinion/will-foreclosure-abuses-ever-end.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
3. E.g., pp. 282–92.
4. See pp. 3, 112.
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threat of eviction for non-payment. These tenants know that a formal evic-
tion on an individual’s record makes finding decent new housing much,
much more difficult. They understand that an eviction record is like a crimi-
nal conviction record—a stain that marks an individual as undesirable for a
range of purposes. Landlords of course also understand this and know that
they can often compel tenants in arrears to leave the premises simply by
threatening to bring a formal eviction for nonpayment of rent. Landlords
build informal and formal eviction into their business model, into the rents
they charge, and into the way they maintain (or do not maintain) their
properties. In the Eviction Economy, informal and formal eviction is not
unusual; it is not the result of some extraordinary happening. Eviction is
entirely the norm.
Desmond explains that this Eviction Economy is terrible not just for the
tenants who are part of it but also for the neighborhoods and cities in which
these tenants live. Eviction translates into insecurity, feelings of powerless-
ness, and depression for poor people who desperately need stability in their
lives. Desmond explains, “Even after years pass, evicted mothers are less
happy, energetic, and optimistic than their peers” (p. 298). Eviction deprives
people of an ability to develop and maintain attachments to a residence, to
neighbors, even to personal belongings (which are often lost in eviction); it
perpetuates severely substandard housing conditions and intensifies the con-
centration of poverty and racial segregation and all its attendant ills; and it
undermines poor people’s efforts to gain and maintain employment, and to
provide their children something like a stable education and a sense of
agency.5 Recurrent displacement through eviction “contribute[s] directly to
what [Jane] Jacobs called ‘perpetual slums,’ churning environments with
high rates of turnover and even higher rates of resentment and disinvest-
ment” (p. 70). Eviction, Desmond argues, reflects poverty, but it is also, at
least in our urban neighborhoods, a cause of poverty in its own right (p.
295). “Our cities have become unaffordable to our poorest families, and this
problem is leaving a deep and jagged scar on the next generation” (p. 299).
Desmond argues that this Eviction Economy in our cities is a relatively
new phenomenon. He argues that “evictions used to be rare” (p. 3) and
were heavily resisted by tenants, even to the point of sparking riots (pp.
3–4). On this score, however, Desmond seems to lack quantitative data, and
perhaps it would be impossible to develop such data.6 As discussed below,
however, there are good reasons to suppose that recurrent eviction of the
poor is a product of relatively recent phenomena.
In documenting the current magnitude of the Eviction Economy,
Desmond begins with court records from his test city, Milwaukee, to derive
a rate of formal eviction and the demographics of those who are formally
5. See p. 252.
6. In theory, one could look to court records to construct historical eviction rates that
could be studied and compared to current rates. It seems implausible, however, that historical
practices of informal eviction could be quantified.
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evicted.7 Drawing on an in-person survey of renter households throughout
Milwaukee, Desmond finds that the rate of informal plus formal evictions is
much higher than the rate of formal evictions (pp. 330–31, 344–45). As
Desmond writes, one in eight Milwaukee renters experienced at least one
forced move in the two years prior to being surveyed, with 48 percent of
those forced moves being informal evictions and 24 percent being formal
evictions (pp. 4–5, 330–31). Thus, about 8 percent or about 1 in 12 tenants
were formally or informally evicted within a two-year period. Scholars have
not yet sought to assess informal eviction rates in other cities, but Desmond
points out that “Milwaukee is a fairly typical midsize metropolitan area with
a fairly typical socioeconomic profile and housing market and fairly typical
renter protections” (p. 333). And nationwide survey evidence that Desmond
cites supports the view that “1 in 8 poor renting families . . . were unable to
pay all of their rent, and a similar number thought it was likely they would
be evicted soon” (p. 5).
Desmond also documents that African American mothers with children
suffer the most in the Eviction Economy. The most harrowing, and madden-
ing, account in Evicted is that of an African American mother named Arleen
and her two sons who are repeatedly displaced, with no cheerful ending
suggested at the end of their travails (pp. 282–92). Desmond’s quantitative
evidence suggests that Arleen’s story is commonplace. As Desmond explains,
women from black neighborhoods made up 9 percent of Milwaukee’s popu-
lation but 30 percent of its formally evicted tenants (p. 98). Poor African
American men are not being evicted as frequently as African American
women (p. 99), perhaps because they are caught up in a crisis of their
own—mass incarercation. As Desmond writes, “[i]f incarceration had come
to define the lives of men from impoverished black neighborhoods, eviction
was shaping the lives of women” (p. 98).
One question Evicted immediately raises is, how it is possible that the
emergence of the Eviction Economy has escaped media and scholarly and
political attention? How has it remained in effect invisible to people outside
poor, urban neighborhoods? How can it be that there is no television or
print coverage of the fact that many poor, urban tenants are facing eviction
after eviction? Why did the foreclosure crisis, by contrast, quickly attain a
prominent place in the national consciousness?
Part of the answer may be that data on eviction, and especially informal
eviction, is not readily available (pp. 295–96). Desmond and his colleagues
had to do a great deal of work to quantify the informal eviction rate in a
single city (pp. 328–33). But almost certainly part of the answer has to do
with class, race, and class- and race-based, physical segregation. The foreclo-
sure crisis disproportionately hit lower-income and minority neighbor-
hoods, but it also very substantially affected working class, middle-class, and
7. See pp. 328–29. Desmond’s methodology is described in detail in Matthew
Desmond, Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 Am. J. Soc. 88 (2012) [hereinaf-
ter Desmond, Eviction].
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indeed even upper-middle-class households. Even a prominent former presi-
dential candidate, Marco Rubio, faced foreclosure.8 Foreclosure crossed ra-
cial and class lines; it impacted inner-city neighborhoods but also suburbs
and exurbs. By contrast, the Eviction Economy, at least as depicted by
Desmond, is the domain of the very poor, and in particular very poor Afri-
can Americans in highly segregated urban neighborhoods (pp. 4–5, 125).
In our history, there is a long tradition of treating as invisible problems
and suffering that is limited to poor, minority neighborhoods. Eminent do-
main for private redevelopment was uncontroversial when it was aimed at
low-income, heavily minority urban areas, but it sparked nationwide debate
and legal reforms when the Kelo v. City of New London9 decision in 2005
highlighted that middle-class, nonminority homeowners also could be af-
fected by the use of eminent domain for redevelopment.10 The ravages of
heroin addiction did not prompt calls for legal reform and addiction treat-
ment until addiction moved from the inner city to largely white, middle-
class suburbs and small towns.11 The rise of the Eviction Economy, perhaps,
remained invisible as long as it did because it did not (and has not yet)
moved out of poor, urban neighborhoods. It has remained largely bounded
by race and class.
By making the Eviction Economy visible, or at least more visible than
otherwise, Desmond’s Evicted performs a great service. This service is almost
certainly a reflection of the powerful way in which Desmond communicates
the story of the Eviction Economy. In 2003, Chester Hartman and David
Robinson published “Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem,” in which
they decried that “[e]ach year, an untold number of Americans are evicted
or otherwise forced to leave their homes,”12 but their article did not appear
to generate much attention. Several years before publishing Evicted,
Desmond published an academic article that summarized the quantitative
and ethnographic findings from Milwaukee that support his views about
eviction and that are elaborated upon in Evicted.13 As far as I can tell, this
academic article, which very much reads like an academic article, did not




9. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
10. See David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor After
Kelo, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 365, 365–66 (2007) (arguing that the fact “reform” efforts in the law
of eminent domain have largely focused on economic development condemnations in middle-
class areas, and not blight condemnations in poor areas, “is fully consistent with the fact that
the two cases that have spawned the greatest public outrage both involved middle-class areas”).
11. Katharine Q. Seelye, In Heroin Crisis, White Families Seek Gentler War on Drugs, N.Y.
Times (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/us/heroin-war-on-drugs-parents
.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
12. Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14
Housing Pol’y Debate 461, 461 (2003).
13. Desmond, Eviction, supra note 7.
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generate any media attention about eviction as a pressing problem. It took
Desmond’s book Evicted and his exceptional gifts as a narrator to make visi-
ble what the cloak of race and class generally renders invisible.
In Evicted, the stories of real human beings are told in vivid, flowing
prose. The footnotes in Evicted are extensive and scholarly but the main text
gives individual tenants and landlords distinctive voices, making them feel
like well-written characters in a novel. Desmond himself remains in the
background of the narrative: as he notes, Evicted breaks with the recent prac-
tice of ethnography in not having the ethnography narrated by a first-person
“I” (p. 334). The reader comes to care about what will happen to the tenants
whose stories Desmond tells, and finishes the book hoping they will find a
way out of the morass of problems they face in their daily lives. Because of
its communicative power, Evicted has reached many Americans who other-
wise might never be motivated to read about—and feel for those caught up
in—eviction in inner-city Milwaukee.
Evicted shows that race divides the Eviction Economy as it divides so
much else in the United States. Specifically, Desmond follows one white
landlord—a trailer park owner—who largely rents to poor whites, all of
whom seem to share the overwhelming goal of not being forced into the
poor African American neighborhoods of Milwaukee (p. 37). He also fol-
lows an African American couple that rents to only low-income African
Americans in poor African American neighborhoods (p. 13). He chronicles
the eviction of eight families, “some black, some white; some with children,
some without” (p. 5).
Powerlessness is Desmond’s overriding theme. The powerlessness of the
tenants in their dealing with what might be called the power players of the
Eviction Economy (the landlords, the storage companies, the courts) reso-
nates throughout the account. One tenant hands over to her landlord what
for her is a huge check to be applied to back rent, but then the landlord tells
her he will keep the check she just gave him but evict her immediately any-
way (pp. 46, 50). A tenant is tossed out after—and really only because—her
mother complains to a building inspector that her daughter’s apartment is
so cold her grandson has fallen ill (pp. 16–18). Because she has an eviction
record, another tenant is forced to rent an apartment that has no working
bathroom or sink or proper locks and is unable to convince her landlord to
fix anything, yet she is too scared to call a building inspector (pp. 69, 74–75,
256). A landlord fails to install required fire alarms and a tenant’s baby dies
in a fire, and yet the landlord is not held accountable and proceeds to collect
the property’s insurance money (pp. 201–03). A tenant who has lost his legs
manages to do work fixing up a unit for his landlord in exchange for rent
owed, but the landlord dismisses his work as unsatisfactory and refuses to
credit him for any work done (pp. 26–31). A tenant falls behind in rent
because she must cover family funeral expenses, is docked benefits for miss-
ing an appointment with her case worker (pp. 62–63), and is then evicted
along with her children (p. 94). One of her sons grows ever more enraged
and explosive as he is shuffled from one unsafe place to live to another (pp.
54–55, 162–63, 212–13, 287–88). And after a seemingly endless struggle to
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find a place for herself and her children, she finds an apartment with a $600
rent that takes up virtually all of her monthly income. Unable to afford to
keep the the lights on after paying her rent, that same tenant has no choice
but to send her children to live away from her (pp. 290–91).
One of the most notable aspects of Evicted is how it illuminates the
strength of these tenants. Arleen, the repeatedly evicted tenant whose chil-
dren are sent off to live with others after the utility company turned the
lights off, is quoted near the end of the book as reflecting:
I wish that when I be an old lady, I can sit back and look at my kids. And
they be grown. And they, you know, become something. Something more
than me. And we’ll all be together, and be laughing. We be remembering
stuff like this and be laughing at it. (p. 292)
Crystal, an evicted tenant contending with a history of sexual abuse and
mental illness (pp. 213–14, 252), buys dinner for a hungry boy at McDon-
ald’s and says, “I wish I had me a house. I would take him in” (pp. 253–54).
Although the landlords complain about pro-tenant courts (p. 107 n.18)
and irresponsible tenant behavior (the tenants do in fact engage in a range
of self-destructive behaviors)14 and the landlords (to Desmond’s credit)
come off as multi-dimensional human beings and not monsters, they seem
to have all the power. They choose which of their tenants in arrears to evict
and which to allow to stay; the landlords know what they are doing in hous-
ing courts whereas their tenants almost never show up; and even when te-
nants do appear in court, they are unrepresented and unable to press a case.
Whereas evicted tenants bear a stain that makes finding new housing ex-
ceedingly difficult, landlords have no problem filling units right after an
eviction. As Desmond notes, “[t]he high demand for the cheapest housing
told landlords that for every family in a unit there were scores behind them
ready to take their place” (p. 47).
II. Why The Eviction Economy Now?
If (as Desmond argues) the Eviction Economy is a relatively new phe-
nomenon, then a key question is, why has it arisen now? Desmond points to
many forces that no doubt have helped to give rise to the Eviction Economy.
But Desmond also identifies “exploitation”—overcharging by landlords—as
one cause of the lack of reasonable rents for low-income households and the
cycle of missed rent payments and eviction (pp. 305–07). If Desmond is
wrong, and housing for the very poor is not now unusually profitable, then
the cost of incentivizing the private market to create and maintain more
such housing may be greater than Desmond suggests. And, as a political
matter, that may make effective reform even more difficult to attain than
Desmond recognizes.
Desmond’s argument as to why the Eviction Economy has arisen relies
not only on reduction in public housing and housing assistance,15 but also
14. See, e.g., p. 107.
15. See pp. 303, 396 n.28; see also Desmond, Eviction, supra note 7, at 106–07 .
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on the growing gap between private-market housing prices and income for
low-income households.16 Housing prices continue to rise, as does the price
of electricity and other basic household costs, whereas welfare stipends and
minimum wage–based incomes have stagnated. As he explains:
Welfare stipends have remained completely stagnant over the past decade,
while the cost of housing has increased by historic proportions. . . . [T]he
fair market rent for a . . . two-bedroom apartment [in Milwaukee] jumped
from $585 in 1997 to $795 in 2008 . . . . During this 10-year span, welfare
stipends did not change. The result is that the average cost of rent, even in
high poverty neighborhoods, is quickly approaching the total income of
welfare recipients . . . . Women resigned to low-wage work fare slightly
better but not by a wide margin. . . . The[ ] . . . increases [in minimum
wage earnings for a 35-hour week] are far outpaced by the climbing cost of
housing . . . .17
Desmond’s account suggests other possible causes for the growth of the
Eviction Economy, such as a suspicion of African American children (and
especially boys) on the part of landlords who may believe such children
bring the unwanted attention of the police.18 Desmond tells how one land-
lord was willing to rent to Arleen and her two boys even though they were
living in a shelter following an eviction, but then when police came to the
apartment to check up on one of the boys who had had a scuffle with a
teacher in school, the landlord demanded that Arleen and her boys leave
(pp. 287–88). In an era marked by less conflict between police and young
African American men, Arleen might have more easily been able to find and
then keep decent housing. But as Desmond writes, “Children didn’t shield
families from eviction; they exposed them to it” (p. 287).
Desmond also tracks the story of a former nurse who fell into an evic-
tion cycle after becoming addicted to opioids (pp. 80–87), and this tenant’s
story could be read as suggesting that the recent rise in opioid addiction has
contributed to the rise of the Eviction Economy. In addition, Desmond ad-
dresses the effects of the local “nuisance” ordinances that have been adopted
throughout the country in recent years and heavily enforced in poor, African
American neighborhoods. These laws encourage landlords to evict tenants
who are the subject of domestic abuse by fining landlords for 911 calls to
their buildings (Chapter Fifteen).19
16. See p. 303. One question is whether the reduction in public housing has led to an
increase in the costs of private, low-income housing, by reducing available supply relative at
least to the population in need. Desmond does not delve into that issue in Evicted.
17. Desmond, Eviction, supra note 7, at 106. Desmond also explains that “[t]o make
matters worse for the very poor, the shortfall of federal housing assistance has coincided with
the emergence of an employment-based safety net” that reserves any available public housing
for parents with low-wage jobs. P. 305.
18. See, e.g., p. 287.
19. For a discussion of the harms caused by these ordinances, see Cari Fais, Note, Deny-
ing Access to Justice: The Cost of Applying Chronic Nuisance Laws to Domestic Violence, 108
Colum. L. Rev. 1181 (2008).
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Desmond’s least persuasive causal story relates to the economics of rent-
ing to low-income households that are part of the Eviction Economy. In
Desmond’s view, landlords in the Eviction Economy are exploiting low-in-
come tenants by charging them rents higher than they need to in order to a
reap reasonable profits (pp. 305–06). This exploitation is one component in
the rise of the Eviction Economy. Desmond makes a similar claim regarding
the rents paid to private landlords pursuant to Section 8 voucher programs;
according to Desmond, these rents are set at levels that reflect prevailing
rents in much more desirable neighborhoods, such that Section 8 landlords
are overcharging taxpayers and using up program resources that would allow
the government to help more of those in need (pp. 148–49).
Desmond’s exploitation argument is problematic on two scores. First, it
is not clear that rental rates have been rising any faster in poor neighbor-
hoods than in other ones; indeed, Desmond himself points out that prevail-
ing nominal rents in poor urban neighborhoods have never been that much
lower than prevailing, nominal rents in safer urban neighborhoods and sub-
urbs (pp. 74–75). “The poor did not crowd into slums because of cheap
housing. They were there—and this was especially true of the black poor—
simply because they were allowed to be” (p. 75). Thus, if landlords have
always overcharged poor tenants in poor neighborhoods, it is not clear that
that overcharging now itself accounts for the new prevalence of informal and
formal and informal evictions.
But the more fundamental issue is this: What does it mean to say that
the landlords in the Eviction Economy are overcharging tenants? If it means
that the status quo is intolerable, in that tenants are being asked to pay rents
they really cannot afford for (often) poorly maintained premises, there is no
question Desmond is correct. But if Desmond is arguing that private land-
lords could provide decent, safe housing to the kinds of tenants who now
inhabit the Eviction Economy at rents substantially lower than the rents they
now charge, then that seems highly doubtful, and the quantitative or ethno-
graphic evidence in Evicted certainly does not prove that.
From Evicted, it seems that the landlords in the Eviction Economy—
mostly individuals or small, family businesses, in Desmond’s account—have
adopted a model of charging higher rents than they know some or many of
their tenants can consistently pay in full,20 presumably because they think
doing so is more profitable than charging lower rents. These landlords rent
to some individuals with real vulnerabilities and problems and complica-
tions in their lives, ranging from addiction to mental illness to medical
problems to highly insecure sources of monthly income, and some of these
tenants would presumably fail to make rent or otherwise pose problems for
continuing their tenancies even if the nominal rents were lower. Although
exactly what motivates the landlords in Desmond’s account is not always
clear, it seems that they charge high nominal rents and collect them when
they can to cover the risk that other tenants will miss payments in due
course; more now covers the risk of getting much less or nothing later. In
20. See p. 75.
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this way, these landlords seem to act like many lenders who charge higher
interest rates to borrowers perceived as having a higher risk of default. Of
course, Desmond’s landlords also “skimp on maintenance” (p. 75), some-
times horrendously and inexcusably,21 but by itself that still does not estab-
lish that they are making a level of profit or return on capital that is
exceptional in the economy as a whole or even in the broader rental housing
market. Nothing in Desmond’s account shows these landlords are quickly,
dramatically getting rich.
In defending the claim of exploitation, Desmond argues, that “[t]he an-
nual income of the landlord of perhaps the worst trailer park in the fourth-
poorest city in America is 30 times that of his tenants working full-time for
minimum wage and 55 times the annual income of his tenants receiving
welfare or SSI” (p. 308). But that fact, which I agree is a troubling fact
among so many others about inequality in the United States, does not tell us
whether Desmond’s landlords are making more relative to reference groups
they would argue are the relevant ones, namely other investors and business-
people. Given how our economy operates, one might ask, why should these
landlords’ return on capital be assessed by reference to the economic situa-
tion of their tenants? We do not generally assume that health care providers
that serve low-income populations or food vendors with low-income pur-
chasers should—as a normative matter—receive lower rates of return on
their investments than entities catering to the wealthy.
Moreover, there is an empirical problem with Desmond’s argument: we
do not see capital rushing in to the Eviction Economy. If the housing market
were even close to an efficient market, one might assume that if Desmond’s
landlords were reaping something like super profits in the Eviction Econ-
omy, if they were making a premium beyond normal returns that cannot be
justified in terms of risk, other actors would enter the market to also reap
unusually high rewards, with the result that supply would increase and even
tenants identified as highly risky would have more choices. There are of
course reasons for outside investors to hesitate to enter these markets: as
Desmond himself notes, it takes a lot of local knowledge to understand
which properties in distressed areas are better for rentals than others and
how to collect rents from a distressed population in a safe and effective
way.22 The landlord Sherrena, for example, “knew the ghetto’s value and
how money could be made from a property that looked worthless to people
who didn’t know any better” (p. 10). Some outside investors may feel that
the learning curve is too high, or the whole endeavor too unsavory, but by
the same token, these investors could hire people like Desmond’s landlords
as their agents to help them. Indeed, Sherrena herself expresses a willingness
to partner with established investors and/or to act as their agent for a fee.23
Certainly, large investors did and still seek to make money selling mortgages
21. See p. 76 (describing the pervasiveness of neglected repairs).
22. See p. 10.
23. See pp. 28–29.
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to low-income buyers and, if they saw high profits as a realistic possibility, it
seems that they would also invest in renting to very poor tenants.24
There really is no a priori reason to believe the investors would be will-
ing and able to offer the kinds of very poor tenants Desmond follows decent
housing at rents lower to or even equal to what the landlords in Desmond’s
account charge. If the government removed part of the risk for landlords—
by guaranteeing the payment or rent, by indemnifying landlords against
other risks posed by tenants—lower rents could be charged. But that would
entail substantial public investment. The current regime is socially unpro-
ductive—indeed untenable. It does not follow, though, that decrying ex-
ploitation will help attract and engage private investors in the project of
doing away with the Eviction Economy.
III. Recommended Reforms
Desmond quite rightly believes the core of the eviction problem—the
grounding for the Eviction Economy—is the lack of decent (or even not that
decent) housing that is genuinely affordable for poor households:
“[A]ffordable rental housing stock has been allowed to deteriorate and even-
tually disappear . . . . The high demand for the cheapest housing told land-
lords that for every family in a unit there were scores behind them ready to
take their place” (p. 47). More supply is absolutely needed. Accordingly,
Desmond’s reform proposals focus on a universal voucher system in which
all landlords would be required to participate; this would in effect guarantee
that all individuals would be able to attain decent housing in any neighbor-
hood for a maximum of something like 30 percent of their income (pp.
308–13). A universal voucher system, such as the one he supports, would
greatly increase supply. But as Desmond recognizes, this proposal presup-
poses political acceptance of decent, non-location-segregated housing as a
basic human right (p. 305). And there is no evidence that there is broad
political support for recognition of such a right in the United States or, for
that matter, for any major public investments to address affordable housing.
Indeed, Desmond himself recognizes that one reason for the rise of the Evic-
tion Economy is that there has been a reduction in support on the part of
the federal and state governments for poor people in the form of both hous-
ing and nonhousing assistance (pp. 302–03).
24. A similar question could be raised regarding Desmond’s argument that Section 8
landlords are overcharging. See pp. 148–49. If Section 8 rent levels are far too high, then what
accounts for the reluctance of many landlords to accept Section 8 tenants? Presumably, the
answer is that the landlords perceive there to be ancillary costs associated with accepting Sec-
tion 8 tenants. Given these perceived ancillary costs, it is not clear Section 8 overpays landlords
but rather perhaps pays what is needed to garner their participation. That said, under a uni-
versal voucher system with mandatory participation, a good part of these perceived ancillary
costs might disappear, inasmuch as such a system would address landlords’ concerns that
renting to Section 8 tenants will drive away other tenants.
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Desmond’s Evicted thus raises the question: Are there reforms that make
sense even assuming we do not see universal vouchers with mandated par-
ticipation or a major government push to vastly expand supply of housing
for low-income households, and instead at best we see some modest efforts
to reverse the decline in public investment in affordable housing? There are a
range of possible reforms that would empower low-income tenants in their
dealings with their landlords but that would not by themselves add to the
supply of affordable housing. Standard economics would suggest that re-
forms that empower tenants without adding to supply would have the effect
of raising the costs to landlords of renting to low-income households. Such a
rise in costs could result in a reduction in the supply of affordable low-
income housing by inducing landlords to raise rents, withdraw units from
the low-income rental market, or reduce their investments in new units for
that market. Hence the question: Are there any particular legal reforms (and
if so, which ones) that would be on net desirable because they might em-
power tenants and assist them in avoiding or escaping the Eviction Economy
even though the reforms might reduce the availability of affordable rental
units? Framed in this light, the questions of which reforms warrant active
pursuit—which warrant the biggest expenditure of limited political capi-
tal—is one of cost-benefit or risk-benefit analysis.
Desmond’s account implicitly suggests two reforms that would pass this
cost-benefit test and that seem to be politically conceivable, even though
both would represent a step beyond what any jurisdictions have considered
or are considering. The first reform would be the automatic sealing of an
individual’s first (and perhaps second) eviction record by the courts. The
second reform would alter retaliatory eviction statutes to bar evictions fol-
lowing the reporting of truly egregious conditions even when the com-
plaining tenant was in arrears on her rent at the time of the report.
Another—and by far the easiest—reform would be reform in legal educa-
tion. Property casebooks basically tell a story of triumph for tenants,
whereby landlord-tenant law was transformed from being pro-landlord to
being pro-tenant, and especially protective of low-income, urban renters.
There is some truth in this story, but only some, and the other side of the
story, the story of the Eviction Economy, deserves a place in property classes
(and, for that matter, property law scholarship). This Part briefly sketches
these three possible reforms.
A. Sealing Records
As Desmond explains, “Both the mark of a criminal record and the stain
of eviction can attenuate one’s chances of securing decent, affordable hous-
ing. ‘I’ll rent to you as long as you don’t have a conviction or an eviction,’
landlords repeated to prospective tenants.”25 In Desmond’s account, some-
times tenants are able to lie about past eviction on rental applications but
the days of that approach appear to be passing: “With the proliferation of
25. Desmond, Eviction, supra note 7, at 120–21 (emphases and footnote omitted).
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cheap tenant screening services, there is good reason to expect the mark of
eviction (and of a criminal record) to become even more consequential in
the coming years.”26
If we want to limit the Eviction Economy, it would seem desirable to
limit a landlord’s ability to see the eviction records of applicants for rental
housing. Once a tenant is marked with an eviction record, her possibility of
becoming trapped in the Eviction Economy increases: she will have to spend
time and energy she may not have to find housing, and is more likely to be
forced to accept housing in worse condition, for more money, in a more
dangerous location, and farther from employment opportunities than other-
wise would have been the case.27 All of that, in turn, increases the risk she
will be informally or formally evicted again or feel compelled by the condi-
tions to leave of her own accord.28 Having an eviction record, in other
words, reduces the evicted tenant’s shot at staying out of the cycle of insta-
bility that characterizes the Eviction Economy. Because one societal goal
should be to reduce the number of households trapped in the Eviction
Economy, it would seem that sealing eviction records—and thus removing
them from the tenant screening process—would represent good social
policy.
There is a counterargument, of course. Landlords plausibly would argue
that they need to know the risk of nonpayment associated with tenants, as
well as other risks, to make informed decisions. Eviction records provide
relevant information, albeit information that is routinely given far too much
weight in a mechanical screening process. One possible reform that would
promote the goal of minimizing the households in the Eviction Economy
while recognizing landlords’ interest in obtaining information about appli-
cants would be to give every tenant one (or two) free pass(es) in the form of
having her first and perhaps second evictions sealed, at least if the evic-
tion(s) were for nonpayment of rent and not for destructive or dangerous
behavior.
This limited sealing measure, which certainly should pass First Amend-
ment scrutiny given the limited public interest in eviction records, also
would provide tenants with the ability to risk fighting back against a
threatened eviction they believe is wrongful. It would also eliminate a form
of intimidation landlords use to drive them to leave informally. As long as a
single eviction on one’s record can deprive a tenant of future housing and
other opportunities, even tenants who are not among the most economically
vulnerable can be cowed from speaking up when their landlords act or fail
to act in palpably unfair or abusive ways.
No jurisdiction has yet adopted, or even seriously considered, a reform
measure of this sort. But there has been some limited legislative action re-
garding eviction records. In Illinois, there have been statutory reforms
passed that require sealing eviction records where the eviction resulted from
26. Id. at 120 n.21.
27. See pp. 296–97.
28. See p. 297.
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a foreclosure of the landlord’s property.29 Illinois also allows for judicial
sealing of eviction records upon motion by the tenant or her lawyer where
there has been a judicial determination that the eviction action was not
proper.30 In Minnesota, a recent statute provides that the court, upon re-
quest of the defendant tenant, may seal the record where judgment was ren-
dered in favor of the defendant.31 These reform statutes, welcome as they
are, do not go far enough when read in light of Desmond’s Evicted. It is
unrealistic to imagine that poor tenants will show up in court and move to
have eviction records sealed, given their very limited resources and other
demands in their lives. And sound social policy should provide for the seal-
ing of at least the first eviction for nonpayment record even though the
judgment is indeed in favor of the landlord.
B. Broadening Retaliatory Eviction Protection
The second reform relates to the doctrine of the implied warranty of
habitability and the related doctrine barring retaliatory evictions. The im-
plied warranty of habitability (“IWH”) has long been controversial among
legal scholars and other commentators because requiring landlords to pro-
vide conditions that meet demanding housing codes has the potential to
hurt those it is supposed to help by increasing rents and decreasing the sup-
ply of affordable housing.32 And Desmond’s account provides some support
for this view. His ethnography begins with Arleen being forced to leave a
dilapidated house the city has condemned but that Arleen loved and that,
perhaps, was better than the drug-dealer-ridden building where she next
finds housing (pp. 2–3). And the landlord, Sherrena, explains that she
avoids participating in the Section 8 program because of the high adminis-
trative and other costs associated with that program’s requirements that
premises be fully up to code (p. 147).
At the same time, the IWH can be justified as a way to pressure the
removal of premises from the market or the repair of premises that truly
pose tremendous risks to the adults and children who inhabit them, not to
29. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-121(c) (2014).
30. See id. § 5/9-121(b) (“The court may order that a court file in a forcible entry and
detainer action be placed under seal if the court finds that the plaintiff’s action is sufficiently
without a basis in fact or law, which may include a lack of jurisdiction, that placing the court
file under seal is clearly in the interests of justice, and that those interests are not outweighed
by the public’s interest in knowing about the record.”).
31. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 504B.345(1)(c)(2) (West 2016) (allowing the court to expunge
records relating to a housing eviction at the time judgment in favor of the defendant is en-
tered, or any time thereafter upon motion of the defendant).
32. For a good summary of the debate over what the effects of the implied warranty of
habitability actually are with regard to rent levels and the supply of affordable housing, see
Michael A. Brower, Comment, The “Backlash” of the Implied Warranty of Habitability: Theory
vs. Analysis, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 849 (2011). See also Michael H. Schill, Comment on Chester
Hartman and David Robinson’s “Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem”—Protection or Pro-
traction?, 14 Housing Pol’y Debate 503 (2003) (exploring the connection between legal pro-
tections for tenants and affordable housing supply).
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mention neighbors. Apartments that lack heat in a place like Milwaukee or
that are fire traps or that are covered with mold pose health risks. Such
conditions compromise the ability of tenants and their children to lead a
decent life, and they are insults to the human spirit and dignity itself.
Because of resource constraints, and perhaps also political constraints,
city inspectors do not routinely inspect premises. Thus, tenant reports to
inspectors that premises have code violations and hence violate the IWH
can, in theory, be a meaningful way to force action on the part of landlords.
Once the doctrine of IWH was established, of course, there had to be a
doctrine that prohibited retaliatory evictions; otherwise, tenants who re-
ported violations would simply be evicted and tenants would soon learn to
be quiet. And indeed court cases establishing a prohibition against retalia-
tory eviction accompanied or soon followed the adoption of the IWH.33
What Desmond’s work teaches us, though, is that we have a retaliatory
eviction doctrine as implemented that is close to meaningless as a way of
promoting more habitable conditions and validating the IWH. As he ex-
plains, very poor tenants fear that they will be unable to keep up with their
rent, and often they do fall behind in payments. These are precisely the te-
nants who live in premises that are likely to have the most most dangerous
conditions. And yet these tenants are not protected by the retaliatory evic-
tion doctrine, which is inapplicable to tenants who are behind in their rent
at the time they complain about conditions.34 Desmond explains:
Tenants able to pay their rent in full each month could take advantage of
legal protections designed to keep their housing safe and decent. Not only
could they summon a building inspector, . . . but they also had the right to
withhold rent until certain repairs were made. But when tenants fell be-
hind, these protections dissolved. Tenants in arrears were barred from
withholding or escrowing rent; and they tempted eviction if they filed a
report with a building inspector. It was not that low-income renters didn’t
know their rights. They just knew those rights would cost them.35
One possible solution to this problem would be to simply modify the
state retaliatory eviction statutes to prohibit retaliatory eviction in all cases
where a tenant complained about a code violation regardless of whether she
was behind in her rent at the time of her complaint. But that might invite so
33. See, e.g., Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1970); Jack Spring, Inc. v.
Little, 280 N.E.2d 208 (Ill. 1972); Berzito v. Gambino, 308 A.2d 17 (N.J. 1973); Voyager Vill.
Ltd. v. Williams, 444 N.E.2d 1337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897 (Pa.
1979); Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1970).
34. See also David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99
Calif. L. Rev. 389 (2011).
35. P. 75 (citation omitted). Technically, a renter who is not yet behind in her rent could
complain about conditions and be protected from a retaliatory eviction but once the condi-
tions were repaired and the tenant fell behind in her rent at some point in the future, the
landlord would be free to evict her. See Joseph William Singer et al., Property Law:
Rules, Policies, and Practices 896–97 (6th ed. 2014). Knowing that, even tenants who are
not yet in arrears have good reason to view themselves as subject to eviction for complaining.
See id.
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many complaints and so many delays in eviction that there would be a sub-
stantial, counterproductive decrease in available affordable housing. What is
needed, then, are reforms that give the IWH some real meaning while also
taking into account the realities of rental housing economics. One such re-
form would be statutory amendments (or court rulings) that broaden the
retaliatory eviction doctrine to protect tenants from eviction in cases where
they report not merely technical code violations, but rather conditions that
pose imminent health and safety risks, regardless of whether they are in
arrears on their rent at the time of reporting. Eviction would be blocked
until conditions were remedied or perhaps, as an alternative, simply for a set
period of time. Some reported premises might be condemned by local au-
thorities and tenants forced to leave, but a statute could also require the
landlord to refund some rent paid in order to facilitate the tenant’s reloca-
tion where the relocation was due to condemnation.
Another possible approach to reforming retaliatory eviction statutes
would place the burden on the landlord to show that the tenant being
evicted after reporting substandard conditions was in arrears on her rent for
a greater amount or for a longer time than other tenants the landlord has
chosen not to evict. This would require, in effect, landlords to disclose
schedules of their tenants and the balances on their rent accounts.36
These sorts of reforms have not been proposed or considered anywhere
to my knowledge, and they would entail greater administrative costs for
courts, local agencies, and legislative bodies. Notably, it would not be an easy
task for public authorities to identify which kinds of code violations re-
present imminent risks to health and safety, as opposed to those violations
that are simply undesirable or represent less than best practices. But if the
IWH is to be a meaningful doctrine, some effort to give real power to the
retaliatory eviction doctrine is necessary.
C. Changing the Property Curriculum
Finally, at least to a professor of property, Evicted also suggests the need
for reform in legal education. Law students become lawyers and sometimes
judges and legislators; what law students are taught about the world thus can
have a real impact on our legal and political systems, and hence, ultimately,
on legal and political reform. Moreover, providing law students an accurate
account of law and legal institutions is a good in itself. Nearly every law
school treats property as a required class, and landlord-tenant law is a stan-
dard part of the class. In the property casebooks used in American law
schools, the lessons of Desmond’s Evicted about how legal doctrines work
and do not work in reality are not taught to the extent they should be.
36. However, one problem with this approach, in addition to requiring more judicial
resources, is that it could encourage landlords to evict non-complaining tenants in arrears
along with complaining ones so as to avoid appearing that they were retaliating against the
complaining tenants.
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Three leading property casebooks—Merrill and Smith,37 Dukeminier,38
and Singer39—address the transformation of landlord-tenant law from a
pro-landlord regime to a pro-tenant one focused on urban, multifamily
housing.40 On the topic of eviction itself, all three casebooks address the
change in the law in the United States whereby landlords were required to
formally evict defaulting tenants rather than resorting to “self-help,” that is,
throwing the tenants’ belongings on the street.41 As the Dukeminier text ex-
plains, for example, landlords lost the legal right to self-help evictions but in
return the formal eviction process was streamlined and made more sum-
mary, as compared to common law ejectment.42 But what none of the
casebooks address is the role landlord self-help still plays in the Eviction
Economy: because landlords often can induce low-income tenants to “vol-
untarily” leave in order to avoid the stain of an eviction record, tenants in
the Eviction Economy simply are locked out of their premises in a way that
would seem to be indistinguishable from the uncivilized days of self-help
evictions.
All three casebooks address the rise of the IWH, although Merrill and
Smith do so only very briefly.43 Still, even Merrill and Smith describe the
IWH as a “runaway success story.”44 The Dukeminier and Singer casebooks
devote substantial time to the question of the adjudication of IWH claims,
particularly in terms of the remedies available to the tenant.45
As already explained, a key point that emerges from Desmond’s account
of the Eviction Economy is that the IWH has limited utility because most
tenants living in poor conditions are or easily could become in arrears, and a
tenant lawfully may be evicted for nonpayment (and threatened plausibly
with eviction) even after she has complained about substandard conditions
(p. 75). None of the casebooks address this point, but rather give the impres-
sion that the statutory prohibitions against retaliatory eviction meaningfully
protect tenants who complain about substandard conditions. Thus, the
Dukeminier casebook explains:
Conventional common law doctrine gave landlords virtually unlimited
freedom to terminate periodic tenancies and tenancies at will upon proper
notice and to refuse to renew expired terms of years. . . . Landlords could
37. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles & Policies (2d ed.
2012).
38. Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property (8th ed. 2014).
39. Singer et al., supra note 35.
40. Id. at 875–85; Dukeminier et al., supra note 38, at 443–540; Merrill & Smith,
supra note 37, at 694–702.
41. Dukeminier et al., supra note 38, at 488–90; Merrill & Smith, supra note 37, at
387–94; Singer et al., supra note 35, at 848–49.
42. Dukeminier et al., supra note 38, at 490–92.
43. See id. at 515–25; Merrill & Smith, supra note 37, at 694–702; Singer et al., supra
note 35, at 875–85.
44. Merrill & Smith, supra note 37, at 694.
45. Dukeminier, supra note 38, at 490, 515–25; Singer et al., supra note 35, at 849–97.
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cope with expanding tenant rights simply by getting rid of tenants who
exercised them, at the same time giving a message to tenants who were
thinking of doing so. So something had to change, and it did. Most juris-
dictions today, whether by statute or judicial decision, forbid retaliatory
action by landlords renting residential space . . . .46
For its part, the Singer casebook devotes more attention to issues sur-
rounding retaliatory action than Dukeminier or Merrill and Smith. The
Singer casebook quotes extensively from Robinson v. Diamond Housing
Corp.,47 an early D.C. Circuit case where an eviction for nonpayment of rent
was deemed an impermissible retaliation for complaints about conditions.48
At the same time, the Singer casebook also excerpts a model retaliatory evic-
tion statute that on its face provides no protection from retaliatory eviction
when the tenant is in arrears for rent at the time the tenant complains about
code violations: Section 5.101(c)(2) of the Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act provides that a landlord may not retaliate against a com-
plaining tenant except the landlord “may recover possession if . . . ‘the ten-
ant is in default in rent.’ ”49 But the Singer casebook never makes explicit the
point that the Uniform Act and specific state statutes that are consistent with
it50 deny any meaningful, actual protection to very poor tenants from retalia-
tory eviction.
Unlike changes in statutes regarding eviction records or retaliatory evic-
tion statutes, changes in property casebooks and curriculums are straight-
forward to implement. These changes will not immediately change any
tenant’s life, but they could help foster a more realistic debate among stu-
dents and faculty about what landlord-tenant law has achieved and what it
could achieve.
Conclusion
Desmond’s Evicted is an extraordinary accomplishment that enriches
our understanding of poverty, urban life, housing, and the law in the United
46. Dukeminier, supra note 38, at 526.
47. 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
48. Singer, supra note 35, at 893–95.
49. Id. at 896–97 (quoting the Uniform Act). Similarly, Burke and Snoe’s text notes that
the retaliatory eviction bar doctrine is applicable only when “the tenant at the time of the
reporting of the code violation [was] not . . . otherwise in material default on the lease,” but
does not address how this limit on applicability undermines the impact of the retaliatory
eviction doctrine. Barlow Burke & Joseph Snoe, Property: Examples and Explanations
320 (5th ed. 2016).
50. The Wisconsin statute that governed the evictions in Evicted contains exactly this
limit on the scope of the prohibition against retaliatory evictions. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 704.45
(West 2015). A tenants resource document published by a Wisconsin NGO, the Tenant Re-
source Center, makes the point even more emphatically than the statute itself: “Wis. Stat.
704.45 provides absolutely no protection against eviction if tenants are behind in their rent
(except if the rent not paid is due to a retaliatory rent increase).” Landlord Retaliation,The
Tenant Res. Ctr. for Hous. Justice in Wis., http://www.tenantresourcecenter.org/landlord
_retaliation [https://perma.cc/FXQ7-HART] (last visited Dec. 23, 2016).
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States. Its account of the lives of low-income tenants is so compelling that it
has made visible and salient a crisis that racial and class divides had ob-
scured. Evicted highlights the need for something to be done to address the
powerlessness of low-income individuals and families who are hard-pressed
to afford the housing that is available in the private market. While
Desmond’s universal voucher proposal would directly undermine the perni-
cious Eviction Economy, there are less sweeping, more politically feasible
reforms, such as sealing eviction records and reforming retaliatory eviction
doctrine, that would represent sensible first steps in addressing the plight of
low-income, urban tenants. At a minimum, Evicted should change how we
understand and teach landlord-tenant law.
